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                      OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                           
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant Ronald Walker appeals the district court's 
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Walker's petition alleges ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the state trial and direct appeal, 
primarily for their failure to press a claim on his behalf under 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (barring racially 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors).  
Although we will affirm the ruling of the district court, the 
procedural history of this case presents an important issue about 
the procedure to be followed by a federal court reviewing a 
habeas corpus petition when a dormant state proceeding is 
reactivated.  The relevant procedural facts are necessarily set 
forth in detail. 
 I. 
 Facts and Procedural History 
 In November 1985, appellant Ronald Walker, armed with a 
double-barrelled shotgun and a handgun, entered the home of his 
estranged wife in Philadelphia.  Walker proceeded to hold his 
wife's mother, sister and daughter hostage in the home for a 
period of approximately twenty-four hours.  After a long standoff 
with police, Walker released the hostages and surrendered.  He 
was then charged with crimes arising out of the incident. 
  
 On October 9, 1986, after a jury trial in the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Walker was convicted of three 
counts of kidnapping, one count of attempted kidnapping, 
burglary, simple assault and possession of an instrument of 
crime.  The judgment and sentence in the case was entered on May 
20, 1987.  On April 13, 1989, Walker's conviction was affirmed on 
direct appeal in an unpublished opinion by the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court.  See Commonwealth v. Walker, 561 A.2d 823 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989). 
 Walker did not file a petition for allocatur to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Instead, on February 28, 1990 he 
filed a pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction 
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. 
(hereinafter "PCRA action"), alleging that both his trial counsel 
and his appellate counsel had been ineffective. 
 Walker's court-appointed counsel in the PCRA action, 
however, failed to prosecute the PCRA petition promptly, 
resulting in a delay of more than two years.1  Thus, on March 19, 
1992, Walker filed this petition for habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
and listed as respondents Donald T. Vaughn by name (the 
Superintendent of the State Correctional Institute at 
                     
1
.  Based on the record provided to this court, it appears that 
between February 1990 and May 1992, the state PCRA court listed 
the action approximately eleven times in an effort to move the 
matter towards resolution, but Walker's court-appointed counsel 
failed to appear on several occasions and arranged continuances 
of other hearings. 
  
Graterford), the District Attorney of Philadelphia, and the 
Attorney General of Pennsylvania (hereinafter referred to jointly 
as the "State").  In his petition, Walker alleged that the delay 
in the resolution of his PCRA action rendered that action 
ineffective to protect his rights, and that therefore his failure 
to exhaust his state post-conviction remedy should be excused. 
   On April 20, 1992, the state court presiding over the 
PCRA action scheduled a hearing for July 2, 1992 and issued an 
order to compel Walker's counsel to attend.  The State, in 
responding on May 14, 1992 to Walker's federal petition, notified 
the district court of this latest development in the PCRA action 
and argued that Walker's obligation to exhaust his state remedies 
should not be excused.  On June 5, 1992, the federal magistrate 
judge issued a Report and Recommendation that, due to the 
pendency of the PCRA action, Walker's habeas petition should be 
denied and dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust his 
state court remedies.  The district court, however, took no 
immediate action regarding this Report and Recommendation, and 
Walker's federal habeas petition remained pending.   
 Walker's court-appointed PCRA counsel did not appear at 
the state PCRA hearing on July 2, 1992.  The state court  
therefore took a number of steps, including threatening the 
imposition of sanctions, in order to force Walker's counsel to 
appear.  While those efforts were largely unsuccessful, Walker's 
PCRA counsel did file an amended PCRA petition on September 30, 
1992.  That amended petition, however, was not accompanied by the 
supplemental memorandum required by Pennsylvania law.  After 
  
several additional missed appearances, the state court ordered 
Walker's PCRA counsel to attend a hearing on December 15, 1992, 
and warned counsel that he risked being held in contempt if he 
did not appear on that date.  
 While the state court was still attempting to compel 
Walker's state counsel to appear in the PCRA proceedings, the 
district court ordered the parties in the federal habeas 
proceeding to appear for a hearing on December 15, 1992 regarding 
the status of Walker's state PCRA action.  The state court then 
changed its hearing to December 14, 1992, and at that hearing 
heard testimony on the merits of Walker's PCRA claim.   
 The following day, December 15, 1992, the district 
court held its hearing on the magistrate judge's report 
recommending dismissal of the federal action because Walker had 
failed to exhaust his state remedies.  Walker testified that his 
PCRA counsel had represented him at the PCRA hearing the previous 
day, and that his original trial counsel had testified as a 
witness.  The district court made no decision at that time.  See 
Transcript of Proceedings, December 15, 1992, at 32. 
 On December 22, 1992, the state court removed Walker's 
court-appointed PCRA counsel, apparently because of his prior 
lack of diligence, and thereafter appointed a replacement.  This 
marked renewed movement in the PCRA action.  
 On January 8, 1993, the district court held another 
hearing, at which Walker's former PCRA counsel testified, and 
advised the court he had been replaced.  See Transcript of 
Proceedings, January 8, 1993, at 6-8.  The district court 
  
acknowledged that "things are beginning to move" in the state 
proceeding, id. at 16, but expressed doubt about whether the 
state proceeding would be resolved expeditiously.  Id. at 9.  
After receiving a supplemental brief addressing the exhaustion 
question,2 the district court issued an order on January 15, 1993 
that disapproved the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate 
judge and ruled, instead, that the delay in the state PCRA 
proceeding was sufficient to waive Walker's exhaustion 
requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).  The district court then 
directed Walker to file an amended habeas petition.   
 On February 1, 1993, with the assistance of his 
federally-appointed habeas counsel, Walker filed an amended 
habeas petition raising thirty-one issues.  After the State filed 
a response to the amended petition, the district court ordered 
Walker to file an offer of proof and brief citation to authority 
in support of each of the thirty-one claims which Walker intended 
to pursue.  See Order of February 26, 1993.  Before Walker 
responded to the district court's order, his appointed habeas 
counsel filed a motion to withdraw in the federal action.  The 
district court therefore continued Walker's obligation to file 
                     
2
.  The State's supplemental brief, which was filed on January 
11, 1993, conceded there had been some prior delays, but argued 
that Walker's PCRA action was now proceeding rapidly through the 
state court system, with additional evidentiary hearings set for 
February 1993.  See Supplementary Response on Issue of 
Exhaustion, January 11, 1993, at 5.  The State proposed that the 
federal court dismiss Walker's habeas action without prejudice to 
renew it if the state proceedings were not fully resolved within 
a reasonable time frame.  Id. at 6-7. 
  
the offer of proof and citation to authority pending the 
resolution of the motion to withdraw. 
 While Walker's federal action was stalled for this 
reason, Walker's state PCRA action was proceeding.  Walker's 
newly-appointed PCRA counsel was permitted to file a new amended 
petition, and between December 1992 and April 1993 the state 
court heard testimony regarding Walker's claims for post-
conviction relief.  Because there was no transcript of the voir 
dire that had been conducted for Walker's trial, the state court 
permitted Walker to present testimony regarding the merits of the 
alleged ineffective assistance/Batson violations.  See App. at 
101. 
 Walker testified that during voir dire, allegedly on 
October 6, 1986, the assistant district attorney who tried the 
case against him "had a problem with black males," App. at 102; 
that the jury ultimately selected was composed of "mainly 
females," App. at 107; that he was "very unhappy" about the 
selection process and complained about the process to his trial 
counsel "several times," App. at 107-08; and that his trial 
counsel told him to "shut up" and declined to object to the 
prosecutor's actions.  App. at 108.  The State objected to this 
testimony, in part because Walker had made no offer of proof 
regarding the number of people on the jury, the number of black 
jurors, and the number of black individuals who were stricken 
from the jury.  Walker's counsel responded that he expected 
testimony or an affidavit on this issue by Walker's trial 
counsel.  However, when Walker's trial counsel did testify on 
  
April 21, 1993, he was not questioned on any Batson-related 
issues. 
 On June 29, 1993, the state court issued an order 
denying Walker's PCRA claim.  The court rejected Walker's 
ineffective assistance/Batson claim, concluding that Walker 
"failed to sustain his burden of proof on this issue."  
Commonwealth v. Walker, Nos. 8601-2553-2575, Memorandum Opinion 
at 10 (Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, filed June 29, 1993). 
 On July 8, 1993, Walker filed an amended federal habeas 
petition containing approximately thirty-three claims.  One of 
the claims asserted by Walker was "that the makeup of the jury 
was prejudicial against petitioner."  At a hearing before the 
district court on July 23, 1993, the State argued that Walker's 
petition did not state a claim for relief, relying upon the 
testimony and record produced in the PCRA proceeding.  Among 
other things, the State argued that Walker failed to create a 
record in the PCRA action that would be sufficient to support his 
ineffective assistance/Batson claim, and asked the federal court 
to "stay its hand" because the PCRA action, which had concededly 
been delayed for some time, could "no longer legitimately be 
called ineffective to protect [Walker's] rights."  See App. at 
61. 
 While the issue was pending in the district court, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected Walker's appeal and, on 
February 2, 1994, affirmed the denial of relief under the PCRA.  
The Superior Court held that Walker's failure to provide the 
notes of testimony or a statement pursuant to Pa. R. App. P. 1923 
  
in lieu of a transcript precluded appellate review of the claim.  
See Commonwealth v. Walker, No. 02523 Philadelphia 1993, 
Memorandum Opinion at 6 (Pa. Super. Ct., filed February 2, 1994).  
Walker then filed a petition for allocatur to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.3 
 On February 16, 1994, while Walker's petition in the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was still pending, the federal 
district court issued its order denying Walker's federal habeas 
petition.  With respect to Walker's ineffective assistance/Batson 
claim, the court stated that "[t]here is no record of how many 
blacks were in the venire, how many were struck by the 
prosecution and the defense, how many blacks sat on the jury, or 
how many peremptory challenges the prosecutor used.  Petitioner's 
insufficient showing precludes review by this court."  Memorandum 
& Order of February 16, 1994 at 15-16.  The district court 
therefore found that Walker had failed to make a sufficient 
record in the PCRA proceeding to support the claim.  
 The district court also commented in another portion of 
its opinion that:  
 [P]etitioner did not avail himself of the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Appellate Procedure that provide an 
opportunity to reconstruct the record for purposes of 
appeal.  Pa. R. App. Pro. 1923, 1924.  Petitioner also 
failed to supplement the record during the PCRA 
proceedings, although he had ample opportunity to do 
so.  Because petitioner does not demonstrate cause for 
failing to develop the record in state proceedings, he 
cannot do so for the first time by federal habeas 
                     
3
.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Walker's petition for 
allocatur on November 30, 1994, after Walker's appeal before this 
court had been filed and fully briefed.  
  
action.  See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.Ct. 1715 
(1992).  
   
Memorandum & Order of February 16, 1994 at 13.  While this 
portion of the district court's opinion did not specifically 
address Walker's ineffective assistance/Batson claim, it appears 
to have supported the court's conclusion regarding that claim. 
 The district court granted Walker's motion for a 
certificate of probable cause, and this appeal followed.  In the 
appeal, Walker challenges only the district court's dismissal of 
his claim for habeas relief on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to object to 
the prosecutor's practice of racial discrimination in jury 
selection.   
 We have jurisdiction over Walker's appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 405 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 593 (1994).  Where a district 
court has denied a state prisoner's habeas corpus petition 
without a hearing on the merits, our review is plenary.  See 




 On appeal, Walker concedes that the record before the 
district court was insufficient to support either a substantive 
Batson claim or a claim for ineffective assistance based on 
defense counsel's failure to raise a Batson claim.  He argues, 
however, that it was unfair for the district court to dismiss his 
action in light of the State's failure to produce any record of 
the jury selection despite the district court's prior order 
requiring it to do so.  Walker contends that the district court 
should have held an evidentiary hearing on the whereabouts of the 
record of jury selection, and, if necessary, should have given 
him an opportunity to reconstruct that record.4 
 In response, the State contends that the district 
court's decision followed the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), holding that, 
absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a federal court may not 
provide a habeas petitioner with an evidentiary hearing where the 
petitioner had an adequate opportunity to develop the relevant 
facts in state court proceedings.  Id. at 1721.  Thus, the State 
reasons, Walker's failure to develop the facts relevant to his 
ineffective assistance/Batson claim during the PCRA proceeding 
                     
4
.  Walker cites no relevant authority to support this position.  
He refers only to Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), in 
which the Supreme Court held that a state's failure to provide an 
indigent criminal defendant with defense counsel in his direct 
appeal was unconstitutional. 
  
precludes the district court from granting him the opportunity to 
do so in this habeas proceeding. 
 Were this the paradigmatic federal habeas proceeding, 
where the petitioner has fully exhausted state remedies prior to 
filing a federal habeas petition, the State's argument would be 
indisputable.  Walker's failure to establish a factual record 
during the PCRA proceeding would be subject to the Tamayo-Reyes 
cause and prejudice standard, and his inability to demonstrate 
cause for his failure to develop the factual record during the 
PCRA action would therefore support the district court's decision 
to reach the merits of his claims without holding an evidentiary 
hearing. 
 This case does not fit neatly within the Tamayo-Reyes 
rule because the Court there addressed a habeas petitioner's 
failure to develop a factual record in a post-conviction state 
proceeding that was exhausted prior to the filing of the federal 
habeas petition.  Id. at 1716-17.  In contrast, here the district 
court concluded that Walker had not demonstrated cause for his 
failure to develop an adequate state court record to establish 
his claim by relying, somewhat paradoxically, upon the 
opportunity presented to Walker at a state proceeding that the 
district court had excused Walker from exhausting.5  We thus must 
consider, apparently as a matter of first impression, the proper 
application of the Tamayo-Reyes rule in these circumstances.  
                     
5
.  The district court's waiver of the exhaustion requirement in 
this case has not been challenged by the State on appeal.  Thus, 
despite our questions about the district court's ruling on that 
issue, we do not reach it here. 
  
 To do so, we return to basic principles.  In general, a 
habeas petition may not be granted "unless it appears that the 
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of 
the State."  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).  The exhaustion rule is not 
jurisdictional.  See Story, 26 F.3d at 405.  Rather, the rule is 
"rooted in considerations of federal-state comity."  Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973).  The rule "is principally 
designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of 
federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial 
proceedings."  Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982).6  The 
exhaustion rule also serves the secondary purpose of facilitating 
the creation of a complete factual record to aid the federal 
courts in their review.  Id. at 519. 
 Similarly, Tamayo-Reyes explained that the cause and 
prejudice rule regarding evidentiary hearings "appropriately 
accommodate[s] concerns of finality, comity, judicial economy, 
and channeling the resolution of claims into the most appropriate 
forum."  Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1719.  The Court also 
commented that its rule was "fully consistent with and gives 
meaning to the requirement of exhaustion" by ensuring that 
factual issues are addressed by the state courts "in the first 
instance."  Id. at 1720.  The exhaustion rule and the Tamayo-
                     
6
.  In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), the 
Supreme Court noted that "[c]omity concerns dictate that the 
requirement of exhaustion is not satisfied by the mere statement 
of a federal claim in state court.  Just as the State must afford 
the petitioner a full and fair hearing on his federal claim, so 
must the petitioner afford the State a full and fair opportunity 
to address and resolve the claim on the merits."  Id. at 1720. 
  
Reyes rule are therefore animated in part by the same concerns: 
comity to the state courts and ensuring that an adequate factual 
record is developed in the state courts. 
 On the other hand, the habeas corpus statute provides 
that exhaustion of state remedies may be excused where there is 
"an absence of available State corrective process or the 
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to 
protect the rights of the prisoner."  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).  The 
principal instance for excusal of exhaustion is inordinate delay 
rendering the state remedy "effectively unavailable."  See 
Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d 353, 354 (3d Cir. 1986); see also 
Story, 26 F.3d at 405-06 (listing cases).  In such circumstances, 
the comity and record-creation concerns of the exhaustion rule 
yield to the federal courts' obligation to serve as a forum for 
the protection of the petitioner's fundamental federal rights.  
See Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1218 (3d Cir. 1987).  
It is unclear whether, once the district court determines 
exhaustion can be excused because of undue delay, the concerns as 
to comity and record-creation remain sufficiently relevant to 
require application of the Tamayo-Reyes rule, the issue presented 
by this appeal. 
 Because most habeas petitions filed during the pendency 
of state proceedings are dismissed for lack of exhaustion, no 
principles have been developed to guide the district court in a 
habeas proceeding as to reliance on a state evidentiary 
proceeding that occurred after the exhaustion requirement has 
been excused.  Cf. Wojtczak, 800 F.2d at 356 n.3 (noting that 
  
after federal court found inexcusable delay in Pennsylvania state 
court post-conviction proceeding and permitted habeas petition to 
proceed, the state court stayed the post-conviction proceeding 
pending the disposition of the federal case).  The issue would 
not have arisen in this case had the district court accepted the 
State's suggestion that it stay all federal proceedings pending 
the resolution of the state court action once it became apparent 
that the state PCRA action had been reactivated.  As a matter of 
general practice, we assume that a district court which has 
excused exhaustion but has not yet embarked upon proceedings of 
substance will stay its hand once there is reliable evidence that 
the state action has been reactivated.  Cf. Picard v. Connor, 404 
U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (noting that states generally must be given 
the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of 
their prisoners' federal rights); see also Burkett, 826 F.2d at 
1218 (affirming a district court's dismissal for lack of 
exhaustion where the petitioner's state case was "proceeding 
normally," but excusing exhaustion where there was no indication 
that state court would soon dispose of petitioner's case).  
 An examination of the Tamayo-Reyes opinion suggests the 
appropriate manner to resolve the issue presented in this case.  
Clearly, the Court wanted to limit a defendant's opportunities 
"to relitigate a conviction."  Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1719.  
More significantly, the Court noted that the cause and prejudice 
rule regarding evidentiary proceedings "serves the interest of 
judicial economy" by preventing defendants from using the scarce 
judicial resources of the federal courts to "duplicate 
  
factfinding" that could have been performed in state court.  Id.  
This focus on judicial economy is consistent with other Supreme 
Court pronouncements regarding the use of the limited resources 
of the federal judiciary in habeas cases.  See Schlup v. Delo, 
115 S. Ct. 851, 864 (1995) (suggesting that review of petitions 
for habeas corpus requires consideration of the "systemic 
interests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial 
resources"); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (noting 
that federal collateral litigation places a heavy burden on 
scarce judicial resources, and threatens the capacity of the 
system to resolve primary disputes).7   
 Thus, a decision to apply the Tamayo-Reyes rule should 
be guided not only by comity and record-creation concerns but 
also by an interest in encouraging judicial economy and avoiding 
duplicative procedures in the state and federal court systems.  
See United States ex rel. Senk v. Brierley, 471 F.2d 657, 660 (3d 
Cir. 1973) (record of a then-pending state proceeding should be 
considered by the district court on remand if the state 
proceeding was final at the time the district court rendered its 
decision).  
 We need not decide in this case what effect should be 
given to state court findings following a state evidentiary 
                     
7
.  See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 260-61 
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring) ("To the extent the federal 
courts are required to re-examine claims on collateral attack, 
they deprive primary litigants of their prompt availability and 
mature reflection.  After all, the resources of our system are 
finite: their overextension jeopardizes the care and quality 
essential to fair adjudication.") 
  
hearing in which the petitioner did not participate because the 
federal court excused exhaustion.  Walker did participate fully 
in the state PCRA hearings that occurred after the filing of his 
habeas petition.  At those hearings, Walker was represented by 
counsel who called various witnesses, including Walker himself, 
to testify in Walker's behalf.  Indeed, a review of the 
transcript of the PCRA proceeding suggests that Walker was given 
every opportunity to create a record sufficient to establish any 
constitutional claims.  Having availed himself of that 
opportunity by appearing and presenting evidence, it would be 
inconsistent with the interests of judicial economy expressed in 
Tamayo-Reyes and other Supreme Court decisions regarding federal 
habeas proceedings to give Walker a second evidentiary hearing in 
federal court.   
 We do not hold that a habeas petitioner must 
participate in a state proceeding that the district court has 
held need not be exhausted, an issue we leave for another day.  
We merely hold that application of the Tamayo-Reyes rule is  
appropriate in this case, where the state prisoner has appeared 
at the state hearing and has had an adequate opportunity to 
develop a record to establish his claim.     
 We recognize that the district court rendered its 
decision relying upon the opportunity provided by the state PCRA 
action while a petition for allocatur in that action was still 
pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.8  Arguably, relying on 
                     
8
.  The district court may have so acted because of concern about 
further delay.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently taken 
  
a state action that is not yet final poses some risk.  
Regardless, at oral argument before this court, the parties 
agreed that Walker's petition for allocatur was denied by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on November 30, 1994, while this 
appeal was pending.  Thus, the district court's reliance upon a 
then-pending state proceeding in reaching its decision cannot now 
provide a basis for the reversal of its decision. 
 We therefore conclude that the district court's 
dismissal of Walker's ineffective assistance/Batson claim was 
proper.  The state court record is insufficient to establish the 
claim, and, having fully participated in the PCRA action, Walker 
is unable to demonstrate cause for his failure to reconstruct 
that record in state court, nor is there any suggestion that a 
miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue in the district court.  Tamayo-
Reyes, 112 S.Ct. at 1721. 
(..continued) 
steps to reduce the delays in reviewing petitions for allocatur 
by appointing a committee to address the problem and adopting new 
internal operating procedures. See Supreme Court Internal 
Operating Procedures, Pennsylvania Law Weekly, Nov. 7, 1994, at 
12; see also Ralph J. Cappy et al., Allocatur Review Must Be 
Perceived As Objective, Pennsylvania Law Weekly, Nov. 21, 1994, 
at 6 (first part of Final Report and Recommendation of the 
Allocatur Study Committee of the State Supreme Court); Ralph J. 
Cappy et al., High Court Needs Central Staff, Funding, 
Pennsylvania Law Weekly, Nov. 28, 1994, at 6 (second part of 
Final Report and Recommendations of the Allocatur Study Committee 
of the State Supreme Court).  
  
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order of February 16, 1994, denying Walker's petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus. 
__________________________________ 
 
